What Makes SecureDrop Unique¶
SecureDrop attempts to solve or mitigate several problems journalists and sources have faced in recent legal investigations, attacks from state actors, and other threats to the confidentiality of communications.
No third parties that can secretly be subpoenaed¶
For decades, there were very few leak prosecutions in the United States in large part because the government would have to subpoena reporters to testify against a source to get a conviction. That proved incredibly difficult, if not impossible, when reporters regularly refused to testify and threatened to go to jail rather than betray a source.
More recently, there have been a record number of leak prosecutions largely because the government has learned they don’t need reporters to testify against their sources anymore. Instead, they can just secretly subpoena third party services like Google or AT&T or Verizon or Facebook and get a treasure trove of digital information on reporters and sources’ communications. For example, the Associated Press had twenty of their phone lines subpoenaed without their knowledge in order to identify a source. The government also got a warrant for Fox News reporter James Rosen’s Gmail account without him knowing. In both cases, their alleged sources were prosecuted, even though journalists never directly divulged their sources.
SecureDrop completely eliminates third parties from the equation and puts the power to challenge such cases back in the hands of reporters. The journalist and source communicate exclusively through one server that the news organization owns and sits on their property, so any legal order for information must go directly to the news organization rather than Google or AT&T. The news organization again has the power to contest the order or refuse to comply if they so wish.
Limits the metadata trail as much as possible¶
In many leak cases, the metadata of a journalist’s communications—where you’re located, who you’re talking to, when you’re talking to them, and how often—can lead to trouble just as much as the actual content of your conversations.
Even if a government serves a court order directly to a news organization to compel the disclosure of information, SecureDrop logs much less information than email providers or phone companies do.
The source can only log into SecureDrop through the Tor Browser, which masks the source’s IP address to begin with, so there is no indication who the source is (unless they disclose it) and where they are sending information from. The Tor IP address, the computer, and the browser type that the source is using is not logged either.
For each source, only the time and date of each submission is logged on the server. When a source sends a new message, the time and date of the last message is overwritten. This means that there won’t be a trail of metadata showing exactly when the source and journalist were talking.
In addition, sources cannot create a custom username that could reveal information about them. Instead, SecureDrop automatically generates two random codenames, one to show to the source and another to the journalists using the system.
Encrypted and air-gapped¶
Communications through SecureDrop are both encrypted in transit, so messages cannot be easily intercepted and read while they are traversing the Internet and are also encrypted on the server so if any attacker manages to break into the server, they would not be able to read past messages.
In addition, the decryption key for SecureDrop submissions sits on an air-gapped computer (not connected to the Internet). This air-gapped computer is the only place SecureDrop submissions are decrypted and read so that they are much harder for an attacker to access.
Protecting against hackers¶
A 2014 study showed that 20 of the top 25 news organization had, at one time or another, their networks compromised by state sponsored hackers.
Because of this threat, SecureDrop completely segments its traffic from a news organization’s normal network. Submissions are accessed and downloaded using the Tails operating system, which boots off of a USB, does not touch your computer’s hard drive, and routes all its Internet traffic through Tor.
Submissions are decrypted on an air-gapped computer also using Tails. This mitigates against the risk that an attacker could send malware through SecureDrop in an attempt to infect the news organization’s normal network as well.
The SecureDrop servers also undergo significant system hardening in order to make it as difficult as possible for hackers to break in.
The SecureDrop servers also undergo significant system hardening in order to make it as difficult as possible for hackers to break in. By doing so, SecureDrop protects sources against networks that are already compromised, as well as a news organization’s normal network from attacks that could potentially come through SecureDrop.
Free and open source software¶
100% of SecureDrop’s code is free and open source. Not only does this mean anyone can install SecureDrop themselves, but the code is available online for security experts to test for vulnerabilities.
SecureDrop has gone through four audits by third party penetration testing firms and will continue to go through audits when major changes are made to the code base in the future. We always publish these audits publicly so everyone can be assured that SecureDrop is as safe to use as possible.