SecureDrop is an open-source whistleblower submission system that media organizations can use to securely accept documents from and communicate with anonymous sources. It was originally created by the late Aaron Swartz and is currently managed by Freedom of the Press Foundation.
SecureDrop is a tool for sources to communicate securely with journalists. The SecureDrop application environment consists of three dedicated computers:
- Secure Viewing Station: An air-gapped laptop running the
- Tails operating system from a USB stick that journalists use to decrypt and view submitted documents.
- Application Server: Ubuntu server running two segmented Tor hidden
- services. The source connects to the Source Interface, a public-facing Tor hidden service, to send messages and documents to the journalist. The journalist connects to the Journalist Interface, an authenticated Tor hidden service, to download encrypted documents and respond to sources.
- Monitor Server: Ubuntu server that monitors the Application Server
- with OSSEC and sends email alerts.
In addition to these dedicated computers, the journalist will also use their normal workstation computer:
- Journalist Workstation: The every-day laptop that the journalist uses for
- their work. The journalist will use this computer to connect to the Application Server to download encrypted documents that they will transfer to the Secure Viewing Station. The Journalist Workstation is also used to respond to sources via the Journalist Interface.
Depending on the news organization’s threat model, it is recommended that journalists always use the Tails operating system on their Journalist Workstation when connecting to the Application Server. Alternatively, this can also be its own dedicated computer.
These computers should all physically be in your organization’s office.
There are four main components of SecureDrop: the servers, the administrators, the sources, and the journalists.
At SecureDrop’s heart is a pair of severs: the Application (“App”) Server, which runs the core SecureDrop software, and the Monitor (“Mon”) Server, which keeps track of the Application Server and sends out alerts if there’s a problem. These two servers run on dedicated hardware connected to a dedicated firewall appliance. They are typically located physically inside the newsroom.
The SecureDrop servers are managed by a systems administrator; for larger newsrooms, there may be a team of systems administrators. The administrator uses a dedicated Admin Workstation running Tails and connects to the Application and Monitor Servers over authenticated Tor Hidden Services and manages them using Ansible.
A source submits documents and messages by using Tor Browser (or Tails) to access the Source Interface: a public Tor Hidden Service. Submissions are encrypted in place on the Application Server as they are uploaded.
Journalists working in the newsroom use two machines to interact with SecureDrop. First, they use a Journalist Workstation running Tails to connect to the Journalist Interface, an authenticated Tor Hidden Service. Journalists download GPG-encrypted submissions and copy them to a Transfer Device (a thumb drive or DVD). Those submissions are then connected to the airgapped Secure Viewing Station (SVS) which holds the key to decrypt them. Journalists can then use the SVS to read, print, and otherwise prepare documents for publication. Apart from those deliberately published, decrypted documents are never accessed on an Internet-connected computer.
Planning & Preparation¶
Setting up SecureDrop is a multi-step process. Before getting started, you should make sure that you’re prepared to operate and maintain it. You’ll need a systems administrator who’s familiar with Linux, the GNU utilities, and the Bash shell. You’ll need the hardware on which SecureDrop runs — this will normally cost $2000-$3000 dollars. The journalists in your organization will need to be trained in the operation of SecureDrop, and you’ll need to publish and promote your new SecureDrop instance afterwards — using your existing websites, mailing lists, and social media.
It is recommended that you have all of this planned out before you get started. If you need help, contact the Freedom of the Press Foundation who will be glad to help walk you through the process and make sure that you’re ready to proceed.
Once you are familiar with the architecture and have all the hardware, setting up SecureDrop will take at least a day’s work for your admin. We recommend that you set aside at least a week to complete and test your setup.
Provisioning & Training¶
Once SecureDrop is installed, journalists will need to be provided with accounts, two-factor tokens, workstations, and so on — and then trained to use these tools safely and reliably. You will probably also need to train additional backup administrators so that you can be sure that your SecureDrop setup keeps running even when your main administrator is on holiday.
Introducing staff to SecureDrop takes half a day. Training a group to use SecureDrop proficiently takes at least a day — and a single trainer can only work with so many people at once. You will probably need to run several training sessions to instruct an entire newsroom. Depending on staff availability, training and provisioning may take a week or more. If you have multiple offices, training will need to happen at each location. Again, the Freedom of the Press Foundation are happy to help you plan and train your team.
Once you have a SecureDrop instance and your team knows how to use it, you should test it thoroughly and then tell the world. The Freedom of the Press Foundation are happy to help you check that your SecureDrop setup is up-to-code and properly grounded. After that, you’ll need to use your existing tools to announce and promote your SecureDrop. There are some best practices for ways to show off and communicate your SecureDrop address, but more is better. Create a promotion/advocacy plan and go wild.