This document outlines the required hardware components necessary to successfully install and operate a SecureDrop instance, and recommends some specific components that we have found to work well. If you have any questions, please email securedrop@freedom.press.

Hardware Overview

For an installation of SecureDrop, you must acquire:

  • 2 computers with memory and hard drives to use as the SecureDrop servers.
  • Mouse, keyboard, monitor (and necessary dongle or adapter) for installing the servers.
  • At least 2 dedicated physical computers that can boot to Tails: one computer for the Secure Viewing Station, and one or more computers for the Admin Workstation(s)/Journalist Workstation(s).
  • Dedicated airgapped hardware for the mouse, keyboard, and monitor (only if you are using a desktop for the Secure Viewing Station).
  • Network firewall.
  • At least 3 ethernet cables.
  • Plenty of USB sticks: 1 drive for the master Tails stick, 1 drive for each Secure Viewing Station, 1 drive for each Transfer Device, 1 drive for each Export Device, and 1 drive for each admin and journalist.

Additionally, you may want to consider the following purchases:

  • a printer without wireless network support, to use in combination with the Secure Viewing Station.
  • an external hard drive to expand the storage capacity of the Secure Viewing Station.
  • an external hard drive for server backups.
  • a USB drive to store backups of your Tails workstation drives.
  • a network switch, if you use a firewall with fewer than four ports.
  • a security key for HOTP authentication, such as a YubiKey, if you want to use hardware-based two-factor authentication instead of a mobile app.
  • a USB drive with a physical write protection switch, or a USB write blocker, if you want to mitigate the risk of introducing malware from your network to your Secure Viewing Station during repeated use of an Export Device.
  • CD-R/DVD-R writers, if you want to use CD-Rs/DVD-Rs as transfer or export media, and a CD shredder that can destroy media consistent with your threat model.

In the sections that follow, we provide additional details on most of these items.


While a printer is not required, we highly recommend it. Printing documents is generally far safer than copying them in digital form. See our guide to working with documents for more information.

Advice for users on a tight budget

If you cannot afford to purchase new hardware for your SecureDrop instance, we encourage you to consider re-purposing existing hardware to use with SecureDrop. If you are comfortable working with hardware, this is a great way to set up a SecureDrop instance for cheap.

Since SecureDrop’s throughput is significantly limited by the use of Tor for all connections, there is no need to use top of the line hardware for any of the servers or the firewall. In our experience, relatively recent recycled Dell desktops or servers are adequate for the SecureDrop servers, and recycled ThinkPad laptops work well for the Admin Workstation/Journalist Workstation.

Please note that very old laptops or desktops may not work for the workstations. Since the release of Tails 3.0, 32-bit computers are no longer supported.

If you choose to use recycled hardware, you should of course consider whether or not it is trustworthy; making that determination is outside the scope of this document.

Required Hardware


These are the core components of a SecureDrop instance.

  • Application Server: 1 physical server to run the SecureDrop web services.
  • Monitor Server: 1 physical server which monitors activity on the Application Server and sends email notifications to an admin.
  • Network Firewall: 1 physical computer that is used as a dedicated firewall for the SecureDrop servers.

An acceptable alternative that requires more technical expertise is to configure an existing hardware firewall.

We are often asked if it is acceptable to run SecureDrop on cloud servers (e.g. Amazon EC2, DigitalOcean, etc.) or on dedicated servers in third-party datacenters instead of on dedicated hardware hosted in the organization. This request is generally motivated by a desire for cost savings and/or convenience. However: we consider it critical to have dedicated physical machines hosted within the organization for both technical and legal reasons:

  • While the documents are stored encrypted at rest (via PGP) on the SecureDrop Application Server, the documents hit server memory unencrypted (unless the source used the GPG key provided to encrypt the documents first before submitting), and are then encrypted in server memory before being written to disk. If the machines are compromised then the security of source material uploaded from that point on cannot be assured. The machines are hardened to prevent compromise for this reason. However, if an attacker has physical access to the servers either because the dedicated servers are located in a datacenter or because the servers are not dedicated and may have another virtual machine co-located on the same server, then the attacker may be able to compromise the machines. In addition, cloud servers are trivially accessible and manipulable by the provider that operates them. In the context of SecureDrop, this means that the provider could access extremely sensitive information, such as the plaintext of submissions or the encryption keys used to identify and access the onion services.
  • In addition, attackers with legal authority such as law enforcement agencies may (depending on the jurisdiction) be able to compel physical access, potentially with a gag order attached, meaning that the third party hosting your servers or VMs may be legally unable to tell you that law enforcement has been given access to your SecureDrop servers.

One of the core goals of SecureDrop is to avoid the potential compromise of sources through the compromise of third-party communications providers. Therefore, we consider the use of virtualization for production instances of SecureDrop to be an unacceptable compromise and do not support it. Instead, dedicated servers should be hosted in a physically secure location in the organization itself. While it is technically possible to modify SecureDrop’s automated installation process to work on virtualized servers (for example, we do so to support our CI pipeline), doing so in order to run it on cloud servers is at your own risk and without our support or consent.


These components are necessary to do the initial installation of SecureDrop and to process submissions using the air-gapped workflow.

Secure Viewing Station (SVS)

1 physical computer used as an air-gap to decrypt and view submissions retrieved from the Application Server.

The chosen hardware should be solely used for this purpose and should have any wireless networking hardware removed before use.

Admin/Journalist Workstation(s)

At least 1 physical computer that is used as a workstation for SecureDrop admins and/or journalists.

Each Admin and Journalist will have their own bootable Tails USB with an encrypted persistent partition that they will use to access SecureDrop. You will need at least one workstation to boot the Tails USBs, and may need more depending on: the number of admins/journalists you wish to grant access to SecureDrop, whether they can share the same workstation due to availability requirements, geographic distribution, etc.

USB Drive(s)

At least 2 USB drives to use as a bootable Tails USB for the SVS and the Admin Workstation/Journalist Workstation.

If only one person is maintaining the system, you may use the same Tails instance as both the Admin Workstation and the Journalist Workstation; otherwise, we recommend buying 1 drive for each admin and each journalist.

We also recommend buying an additional USB drive for making regular backups of your Tails workstations.

One thing to consider is that you are going to have a lot of USB drives to keep track of, so you should consider how you will label or identify them and buy drives accordingly. Drives that are physically larger are often easier to label (e.g. with tape, printed sticker or a label from a labelmaker).

Two-factor Device

Two-factor authentication is used when connecting to different parts of the SecureDrop system. Each admin and each journalist needs a two-factor device. We currently support two options for two-factor authentication:

  • Your existing smartphone with an app that computes TOTP codes (e.g. FreeOTP for Android and for iOS).
  • A dedicated hardware dongle that computes HOTP codes (e.g. a YubiKey).


We recommend using FreeOTP (available for Android and for iOS) to generate two-factor codes because it is Free Software. However, if it does not work for you for any reason, alternatives exist:

Transfer Device(s) and Export Device(s)

Journalists need physical media (known as the Transfer Device) to transfer encrypted submissions from the Journalist Workstation to the Secure Viewing Station, to decrypt and view them there. If they deem a submission to be newsworthy, they may need physical media (known as the Export Device) to copy it to their everyday workstation.

Our standard recommendation is to use USB drives, in combination with volume-level encryption and careful data hygiene. Our documentation, including the journalist guide, is based on this approach. We also urge the use of a secure printer or similar analog conversions to export documents from the Secure Viewing Station, whenever possible.

You may want to consider enforcing write protection on USB drives when only read access is needed, or you may want to implement a workflow based on CD-Rs or DVD-Rs instead. We encourage you to evaluate these options in the context of your own threat model.

Please find some notes regarding each of these methods below, and see our recommendations in the setup guide for additional background.

USB drives

We recommend using one or multiple designated USB drives as the Transfer Device(s), and one or multiple designated USB drives as the Export Device(s). Whether one or multiple drives are appropriate depends on the number of journalists accessing the system, and on whether the team is distributed or not.

Our documentation explains how the Transfer Device can be encrypted using LUKS, and how the Export Device can be encrypted using VeraCrypt (which works across platforms). We have not evaluated hardware-based encryption options; if you do select a hardware solution, make sure that both devices work in Tails, and that the Export Device also works on the operating system(s) used by journalists accessing the Secure Viewing Station.

USB drives with write protection (optional)

When it is consistently applied and correctly implemented in hardware, write protection can prevent the spread of malware from the computers used to read files stored on a Transfer Device or an Export Device.

It is especially advisable to enable write protection before attaching an Export Device to an everyday workstation that lacks the security protections of the Tails operating system. For defense in depth, you may also want to enable write protection before attaching a Transfer Device to the Secure Viewing Station.

The two main options to achieve write protection of USB drives are:

  • drives with a built-in physical write protection switch
  • a separate USB write blocker device as used in forensic applications.

DVD-Rs or CD-Rs

Single-use, write-once media can be used to realize a transfer and export workflow that is always one-directional: files are transferred to the Secure Viewing Station and the media used to do so are destroyed; files are exported from the Secure Viewing Station and the media used to do so are destroyed.

If you want to realize such a workflow, we recommend purchasing separate drives for each computer that will write to or read from the media, to minimize the risks from malware compromising any one drive’s firmware.

You will also need a stack of blank DVD/CD-Rs, which you can buy anywhere, and a method to securely destroy media after use. Depending on your threat model, this can be very expensive; a cheap shredder can be purchased for less than $50, while shredders designed for use in Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) sell for as much as $3,000.

Monitor, Keyboard, Mouse

You will need these to do the initial installation of Ubuntu on the Application and Monitor Servers.

Depending on your setup, you may also need these to work on the SVS.

Optional Hardware

This hardware is not required to run a SecureDrop instance, but most of it is still recommended.

Offline Printer

We highly recommend purchasing a printer for your Secure Viewing Station and using it as the preferred method to make copies of documents received via SecureDrop.

By printing a submission, even a non-technical user can effectively mitigate many of the complex risks associated with malware or hidden metadata embedded in files received via SecureDrop. Your organization may also already have robust procedures in place for destroying sensitive printed documents.


To maintain the integrity of the air-gap, this printer should be dedicated to use with the Secure Viewing Station, connected via a wired connection, and should not have any wireless communication capabilities.

While printing is notable for what it strips away, it is also important to remember what it preserves: QR codes or links that journalists may scan or type in; printer tracking information included in a scanned document; other visually encoded information. See the Risks From Malware section in the Journalist Guide for further guidance on this subject.

Offline Storage

The SVS is booted from a Tails USB drive, which has an encrypted persistent volume but typically has a fairly limited storage capacity since it’s just a USB drive. For installations that expect to receive a large volume of submissions, we recommend buying an external hard drive that can be used to store submissions that have been transferred from the Application Server to the SVS.


Like all storage media associated with SecureDrop, this drive should be encrypted and protected with a secure passphrase. We recommend using the tools built into Tails to encrypt the drive using LUKS.

If you are planning to use hardware RAID and/or hardware-based encryption, we recommend that you research Tails compatibility before a procurement decision.

Backup Storage

It’s useful to run periodic backups of the servers in case of failure. We recommend buying an external hard drive to store server backups.

Because this drive will be connected to the Admin Workstation to perform backups, it should not be the same drive used for Offline Storage.


Like all storage media associated with SecureDrop, this drive should be encrypted and protected with a secure passphrase. We recommend using the tools built into Tails to encrypt the drive using LUKS.

If you are planning to use hardware RAID and/or hardware-based encryption, we recommend that you research Tails compatibility before a procurement decision.

Network Switch

If you follow our firewall recommendations, you do not need to purchase a switch.

If you use a firewall with fewer than four ports, you will need an additional Ethernet switch to perform installation and maintenance tasks with the Admin Workstation without disconnecting one of your servers.

Labeling Equipment

As you have probably noticed by now, a SecureDrop installation has a plethora of components. Some of these components can be hard to tell apart; for example, if you buy 3 of the same brand of USB sticks to use for the Admin Workstation, Journalist Workstation, and Secure Viewing Station, they will be indistinguishable from each other unless you label them. We recommend buying some labeling equipment up front so you can label each component as you provision it during the installation process.

There is a multitude of options for labeling equipment. We’ve had good results with small portable labelmakers, such as the Brother P-Touch PT-210 or the Epson LabelWorks LW-300. We like them because they produce crisp, easy-to-read labels, and it’s easy to customize the size of the label’s text, which is great for clearly labeling both large components (like computers) and small components (like USB sticks).

If you do not have a label maker available but have an inkjet printer available to you, it may also be possible to print and cut out labels using adhesive-backed paper and some scissors. These are some labels designed by our team which may be used for labeling:

Specific Hardware Recommendations

Application and Monitor Servers

We currently recommend Intel 7- and 8-series NUCS for SecureDrop servers.


If using non-recommended hardware, ensure you remove as much extraneous hardware as physically possible from your servers. This could include: speakers, cameras, microphones, fingerprint readers, wireless, and Bluetooth cards.

The Intel NUC (Next Unit of Computing) is an inexpensive, quiet, low-power device that can be used for the SecureDrop servers. There are a variety of models to choose from.

NUCs typically come as kits, and some assembly is required. You will need to purchase the RAM and hard drive separately for each NUC and insert both into the NUC before it can be used. We recommend:

  • 2x 240GB SSDs (2.5” or M.2, depending on your choice of kit)
  • 1x memory kit of compatible 2x8GB sticks - You can put one 8GB memory stick in each of the servers.

Intel 8th-gen NUC

We have tested and can recommend the NUC8i5BEK. It provides a single storage option: an M.2 NVMe or SATA SSD.


The Ubuntu 16.04 install kernel does not support the NUC8’s built-in Ethernet NIC, so a 16.04-compatible USB Ethernet adaptor is required for the OS installation. The Ethernet adaptor will not be needed after the installation is complete, as SecureDrop’s custom kernel does support the built-in NIC.

For more information on the NUC8-specific steps required during the OS install, see Enabling Network Support for the NUC8i5BEK.

The NUC8i5BEK has soldered-on wireless components, which cannot easily be removed. For security reasons, we recommend that you take the following steps to disable wireless functionality:

  • before installation of the RAM and storage, disconnect the wireless antennae leads:

NUC8 leads

  • before the initial OS installation, boot into the BIOS by pressing F2 at startup, navigate to Advanced > Devices > Onboard Devices, and disable unwanted hardware - everything except LAN:

NUC8 VisualBIOS1

  • navigate to Advanced > Security in the BIOS and disable SGX support, which is not used by SecureDrop and may be targeted by active CPU exploits:

NUC8 VisualBIOS2

  • navigate to Advanced > Boot > Secure Boot and uncheck the Secure Boot checkbox:

NUC8 VisualBIOS SecureBoot

Enabling Network Support for the NUC8i5BEK

The Ubuntu 16.04 installer uses a 4.4-series Linux kernel, which does not include support for the NUC8-series built-in NIC. In order to complete the Ubuntu OS install on the SecureDrop servers, a USB Ethernet adaptor that is supported by the install may be used. The adaptor should not be used as part of the final system setup, however. Instead, before installing SecureDrop, the Ubuntu kernel should be updated to a version with support for the built-in NIC, and the network configuration should be updated to use it instead of the USB adaptor.

To do so, after rebooting the server following the initial Ubuntu install, follow the steps below:

  1. Log in at the console as the admin user created during the initial install.

  2. Verify that the server is using a 4.4-series kernel with the command uname -r.

  3. Check the USB adaptor’s interface name with the command ip link show - it should list two network interfaces: the loopback device lo, and an interface with a longer name - the latter is the USB adaptor’s interface name.

  4. Upgrade to the Ubuntu 16.04 HWE kernel using the following commands:

    sudo apt-get update
    sudo apt-get dist-upgrade
    sudo apt install --install-recommends linux-generic-hwe-16.04
  5. Reboot the system, log in at the console, and verify that it is now running a 4.15-series kernel with the command uname -r

  6. Verify that the built-in NIC is now enabled via ip link show. There should now be 3 devices listed, lo, the adaptor interface, and eno1, the interface name of the built-in NIC.

  7. Edit the network interface configuration file with the command:

    sudo vi /etc/network/interfaces

    Note the two references to the USB adaptor interface name in the lines:

    # the primary network interface
    auto <USB adaptor interface name>
    iface <USB adaptor interface name> inet static

    Update them to read as follows:

    # the primary network interface
    auto eno1
    iface eno1 inet static

    Then save the changes, disconnect the Ethernet cable from the USB adaptor, connect the cable to the onboard Ethernet port, disconnect the adaptor, and reboot the system.

  8. Log in and verify that lo and eno1 are the only interfaces listed, via ip link show, and that external connectivity is working, via curl -I www.google.com for example.

Next, proceed with the rest of the SecureDrop installation.

Intel 7th-gen NUC

We have tested and can recommend the NUC7i5BNH.

The NUC7i5BNH has soldered-on wireless components, which cannot easily be removed. For security reasons, we recommend that you take the following steps to disable wireless functionality:

  • before installation of the RAM and storage, disconnect the wireless antennae leads.

NUC7 leads

  • before the initial OS installation, boot into the BIOS by pressing F2 at startup, navigate to Advanced > Devices > Onboard Devices, and disable unwanted hardware - everything except LAN.

Visual BIOS

Other 7th-generation NUCs have also been reported to work, although we have not tested them. For example, the NUC7i5DNHE uses the same Ethernet chipset as the NUC7i5BNH, and also has a removable wireless card, simplifying the server setup process. However, it may be harder to find a retail source for this model.

Previous Server Recommendations

Intel 5th-gen NUC

We previously recommended the NUC5i5MYHE, however, it has now reached end-of-life. We will continue to support and test SecureDrop on this hardware, but if you are building a new SecureDrop instance we recommend using 7th- or 8th-generation NUCs instead.


If you encounter issues booting Ubuntu on the NUC5, try updating the BIOS according to these instructions.

2014 Mac Minis

We previously recommended the 2014 Apple Mac Minis (part number MGEM2) for installing SecureDrop. These will soon be officially obsolete. Unfortunately the 2018 revision of the Mac Mini is not a viable candidate for use with SecureDrop, as security features of the device prevent Linux from being installed on its internal storage. We will continue to support existing instances using 2014 Mac Minis, but if you are building a new instance we recommend using Intel NUCs.

2014 Mac Minis have removable wireless cards that you should remove. This requires a screwdriver for non-standard TR6 Torx security screws.

However, on the first install of Ubuntu Server the Mac Minis will not boot: this is a known issue. The workaround requires a one-time modification after you install Ubuntu but before you move on to install SecureDrop. After Ubuntu is installed, for each Mac Mini you should:

  1. Connect your Ubuntu installation media (USB drive or CD)

  2. Boot your Mac Mini while holding down the Option key.

  3. Select EFI Boot and select Rescue a broken system at the Ubuntu install screen.

  4. Accept the default options for the install steps until you get to Device to use as root file system.

  5. At the Device to use as root file system prompt, select /dev/mon-vg/root or /dev/app-vg/root for the monitor and application servers respectively.

  6. Select to mount the separate /boot partition.

  7. Select Execute a shell in /dev/mon-vg/root (or /dev/app-vg/root) and select Continue.

  8. You should now be at a rescue Linux shell. Type efibootmgr, and you should see the following:

    BootCurrent: 0000
    Timeout: 5 seconds
    BootOrder: 0080
    Boot0000* ubuntu
    Boot0080* Mac OS X
  9. Type efibootmgr -o 00.

  10. Again type efibootmgr. This time you should see the following:

    BootCurrent: 0000
    Timeout: 5 seconds
    BootOrder: 0000
    Boot0000* ubuntu
    Boot0080* Mac OS X
  11. Type exit.

  12. Select Reboot the system and remove the installation media. Your server should now boot to Ubuntu by default.

Journalist Workstation and Admin Workstation

Both the Journalist Workstation and the Admin Workstation must be compatible with the Tails operating system. Compare any hardware you want to procure or allocate for this purpose against the list of known issues maintained by the Tails project, but please be advised that the list is far from exhaustive.

We advise against using Macs, as there are many Tails compatibility issues both with older and with newer models. Instead, we recommend the ThinkPad T series, and have had good experiences specifically with the T420 and T440. The ThinkWiki is an excellent, independently maintained resource for verifying general Linux compatibility of almost any ThinkPad model.

For any Tails workstation, we recommend at least 8GB of RAM.

Secure Viewing Station (SVS)

The Secure Viewing Station is a machine that is kept offline and only ever used together with the Tails operating system. This machine will be used to generate the GPG keys used by SecureDrop to encrypt submissions, as well as decrypt and view submissions. Since this machine will never touch the Internet or run an operating system other than Tails, it does not need a hard drive or network device; in fact, we recommend removing these components if they are already present.

As with the workstations, one good option is to buy a Linux-compatible laptop from the Lenovo ThinkPad T series. We have tested the T420 and successfully removed the wireless components with ease. It’s possible to re-purpose old laptops from other manufacturers, as long as the wireless components are removable.

Just as with the servers, you can also use an Intel NUC for the SVS. As noted before, NUCs do not ship with a hard drive, and older models can be configured without any wireless components. However, NUCs do contain an IR receiver, which we recommend taping over with opaque masking tape.

If you choose to use an Intel NUC, you must use an older model that offers wireless as an option (described as something like M.2 22×30 slot and wireless antenna pre-assembled (for wireless card support)). If a model is advertised as having “integrated wireless” (most newer NUC models), this means the wireless components are not physically removable, and these machines are not a suitable choice for the SVS.

Tails USBs

We strongly recommend getting USB 3.0-compatible drives to run Tails from. The transfer speeds are significantly faster than USB 2.0, which means a live operating system booting from one will be much faster and more responsive.

You will need at least an 8GB drive to run Tails with an encrypted persistent partition. We recommend getting something in the 16-64GB range so you can handle large amounts of submissions without hassle. Anything more than that is probably overkill.

Transfer Device(s) and Export Device(s)

For USB drives with physical write protection, we have tested the Kanguru SS3 on Tails, and it works well with and without encryption.

If you want to use a setup based on CD-Rs or DVD-Rs, we’ve found the CDR/DVD writers from Samsung and LG to work reasonably well; you can find some examples here.

Please see our recommendations in the setup guide for additional background.

Network Firewall

We recommend the pfSense SG-3100. It has 3 NICs and an internal switch, increasing the number of available ports to 6.

Network Switch

This is optional, for people who are using a firewall with less than 4 ports. Any old switch with more than 3 ports will do, such as the 5-port Netgear ProSafe Ethernet Switch.


Careful consideration should be given to the printer used with the SVS. Most printers today have wireless functionality (WiFi or Bluetooth connectivity) which should be avoided because it could be used to compromise the air-gap.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to find printers that work with Tails, and it is increasingly difficult to find non-wireless printers at all. To assist you, we have compiled the following partial list of air-gap-safe printers that have been tested and are known to work with Tails:

Printer Model Testing Date Tails Versions Printer Type
HP DeskJet F4200 06/2017 3.0 Color Inkjet
HP DeskJet 1112 06/2017 3.0 Color Inkjet
HP DeskJet 1110 08/2017 3.1 Color Inkjet
HP LaserJet 400 M401n 06/2015 1.4 Monochrome Laser
HP DeskJet 6940 04/2015 1.3.2 Monochrome Injket


We’ve documented both the HP DeskJet F4200 and HP LaserJet 400 M401n with screenshots of the installation process, in our section on Setting Up a Printer in Tails. While the F4200 installed automatically, the 400 M401n required that we set “Make and model” to “HP LaserJet 400 CUPS+Gutenprint v5.2.9” when manually configuring the drivers.

If you know of another model of printer that fits our requirements and works with Tails, please submit a pull request to add it to this list.

Monitor, Keyboard, Mouse

We don’t have anything specific to recommend when it comes to displays. You should make sure you know what monitor cable you need for the servers, since you will need to connect them to a monitor to do the initial Ubuntu installation.

You should use a wired (USB) keyboard and mouse, not wireless.