This document outlines the required hardware components necessary to successfully install and operate a SecureDrop instance, and recommends some specific components that we have found to work well. If you have any questions, please email email@example.com.
These are the core components of a SecureDrop instance.
- Application Server: 1 physical server to run the SecureDrop web services.
- Monitor Server: 1 physical server which monitors activity on the Application Server and sends email notifications to an administrator.
- Network Firewall: 1 physical computer that is used as a dedicated firewall for the SecureDrop servers.
We are often asked if it is acceptable to run SecureDrop on cloud servers (e.g. Amazon EC2, DigitalOcean, etc.) or on dedicated servers in third party datacenters instead of on dedicated hardware hosted in the organization. This request is generally motivated by a desire for cost savings and/or convenience. However: we consider it critical to have dedicated physical machines hosted within the organization for both technical and legal reasons:
- While the documents are stored encrypted at rest (via PGP) on the SecureDrop application server, the documents hit server memory unencrypted (unless the source used the GPG key provided to encrypt the documents first before submitting), and are then encrypted in server memory before being written to disk. If the machines are compromised then the security of source material uploaded from that point on cannot be assured. The machines are hardened to prevent compromise for this reason. However, if an attacker has physical access to the servers either because the dedicated servers are located in a datacenter or because the servers are not dedicated and may have another virtual machine co-located on the same server, then the attacker may be able to compromise the machines. In addition, cloud servers are trivially accessible and manipulable by the provider that operates them. In the context of SecureDrop, this means that the provider could access extremely sensitive information, such as the plaintext of submissions or the encryption keys used to identify and access the Tor Hidden Services.
- In addition, attackers with legal authority such as law enforcement agencies may (depending on the jurisdiction) be able to compel physical access, potentially with a gag order attached, meaning that the 3rd party hosting your servers or VMs may be legally unable to tell you that law enforcement has been given access to your SecureDrop servers.
One of the core goals of SecureDrop is to avoid the potential compromise of sources through the compromise of third party communications providers. Therefore, we consider the use of virtualization for production instances of SecureDrop to be an unacceptable compromise and do not support it. Instead, dedicated servers should be hosted in a physically secure location in the organization itself. While it is technically possible to modify SecureDrop’s automated installation process to work on virtualized servers (for example, we do so to support our CI pipeline), doing so in order to run it on cloud servers is at your own risk and without our support or consent.
SecureDrop depends on the Tails operating system for its bootable USB drives. The upcoming version of Tails, Tails 3.0, will no longer support 32-bit computers. The current targeted release date for Tails 3.0 is June 13, 2017.
To see if you have a 64-bit machine, run
uname -m from a terminal. If you
x86_64, then Tails should work on your current machine. If, on the
other hand, you see
i686, your current machine will not work with Tails
3.0. For more details, see the Tails website.
These components are necessary to do the initial installation of SecureDrop and to process submissions using the airgapped workflow.
- Secure Viewing Station (SVS): 1 physical computer used as an
airgap to decrypt and view submissions retrieved from the
- The chosen hardware should be solely used for this purpose and should have any wireless networking hardware removed before use.
- Admin/Journalist Workstation(s): At least 1 physical computer
that is used as a workstation for SecureDrop admins and/or
- Each Admin and Journalist will have their own bootable Tails USB with an encrypted persistent partition that they will use to access SecureDrop. You will need at least one workstation to boot the Tails USBs, and may need more depending on: the number of admins/journalists you wish to grant access to SecureDrop, whether they can share the same workstation due to availability requirements, geographic distribution, etc.
- USB drive(s): At least 2 USB drives to use as a bootable Tails
USB for the SVS and the Admin Tails/Journalist Tails.
- If only one person is maintaining the system, you may use the same Tails instance as both the Admin Tails and the Journalist Tails; otherwise, we recommend buying 1 drive for each admin and each journalist.
- We also recommend buying two additional USBs to use as bootable backups of the SVS and Admin Tails.
- Two-factor authenticator: Two-factor authentication is used when connecting to different parts of the SecureDrop system. Each admin and each journalist needs a two-factor authenticator. We currently support two options for two-factor authentication:
- Transfer Device(s): You need a mechanism to transfer encrypted
submissions from the Journalist Workstation to the SVS to
decrypt and view them. The most common transfer devices are DVD/CD-R
discs and USB drives.
- From a security perspective, it is preferable to use write-once media such as DVD/CD-R discs because it eliminates the risk of exfiltration by malware that persists on the Transfer Device (e.g. BadUSB).
- On the other hand, using write-once media to transfer data is typically inconvenient and time-consuming. You should consider your threat model and choose your transfer device accordingly.
- Monitor, Keyboard, Mouse: You will need these to do the initial
installation of Ubuntu on the Application and Monitor servers.
- Depending on your setup, you may also need these to work on the SVS.
If you cannot afford to purchase new hardware for your SecureDrop instance, we encourage you to consider re-purposing existing hardware to use with SecureDrop. If you are comfortable working with hardware, this is a great way to set up a SecureDrop instance for cheap.
Since SecureDrop’s throughput is significantly limited by the use of Tor for all connections, there is no need to use top of the line hardware for any of the servers or the firewall. In our experience, relatively recent recycled Dell desktops or servers are adequate for the SecureDrop servers, and recycled Thinkpad laptops work well for the Admin/Journalist workstations.
If you choose to use recycled hardware, you should of course consider whether or not it is trustworthy; making that determination is outside the scope of this document.
This hardware is not required to run a SecureDrop instance, but most of it is still recommended.
- Offline Printer: It is often useful to print submissions from the
SVS for review and annotation.
- To maintain the integrity of the airgap, this printer should be dedicated to use with the SVS, connected via a wired connection, and should not have any wireless communication capabilities.
- Offline Storage: The SVS is booted from a Tails USB drive, which has an encrypted persistent volume but typically has a fairly limited storage capacity since it’s just a USB drive. For installations that expect to receive a large volume of submissions, we recommend buying an external hard drive that can be encrypted and used to store submissions that have been transferred from the Application Server to the SVS.
- Backup storage: It’s useful to run periodic backups of the
servers in case of failure. We recommend buying an external hard
drive that can be encrypted and used to store server backups.
- Since this drive will be connected to the Admin Workstation to perform backups, it should not be the same drive used for Offline Storage.
- Network Switch: If your firewall has fewer than four NIC’s, you will need an additional Ethernet switch to perform installation and maintenance tasks with the Admin Workstation. This switch is generally useful because it allows you to connect the Admin Workstation to your firewall’s LAN port without taking down either of the SecureDrop servers.
Specific Hardware Recommendations¶
The Intel NUC (Next Unit of Computing) is a capable, cheap, quiet, and low-powered device that can be used for the SecureDrop servers. There are a variety of models to choose from. We recommend the D54250WYK because it has a mid-range CPU (Intel i5), the common Mini DisplayPort connector for the monitor, and USB 3.0 ports for faster OS installation and data transfer.
Conveniently (for the paranoid), it supports wireless networking (Wifi and Bluetooth) through optional expansion cards not included by default - which means you don’t have to spend time ripping out the wireless hardware before beginning the installation.
If you purchase the NUC from Amazon, make sure you click “With Powercord” to have one included in the package.
The NUCs come as kits, and some assembly is required. You will need to purchase the RAM and hard drive separately for each NUC and insert the cards into the NUC before it can be used. We recommend:
The D54250WYK has recently been EOL’ed by Intel. Availability and prices may be subject to change. We are working on analyzing alternative recommendations, but there are no immediately obvious alternatives that share the benefits of the D54250WYK (primarily, the lack of integrated wireless networking hardware).
An earlier release of SecureDrop (0.2.1) was based on Ubuntu 12.04.1 (precise). We encountered issues installing this version of Ubuntu on some types of Intel NUCs. The problem manifested after installing Ubuntu on the NUC. The installation would complete, but rebooting after installation would not succeed.
We have not encountered this or any similar problems in testing the current release series (0.3.x) with the Intel NUCs. Since 0.3 is based on Ubuntu 14.04.1 (trusty), we believe the issue has been resolved in the newer release of Ubuntu.
If you do encounter issues booting Ubuntu on the NUCs, try updating the BIOS according to these instructions.
Some BIOS versions on the NUC will cause the server to brick itself if the device attempts to suspend. Some suggestions include disabling suspend in the BIOS as well as OS options like “wake on LAN”.
Secure Viewing Station (SVS)¶
The Secure Viewing Station is a machine that is kept offline and only ever used together with the Tails operating system. This machine will be used to generate the GPG keys used by SecureDrop to encrypt submissions, as well as decrypt and view submissions. Since this machine will never touch the Internet or run an operating system other than Tails, it does not need a hard drive or network device; in fact, we recommend removing these components if they are already present.
One option is to buy a Linux-compatible laptop such as a Lenovo Thinkpad. You can also repurpose an old laptop if you have one available.
Another option is to buy an Intel NUC D54250WYK (same model as the servers) with a power cord and 4 GB of memory, but note that you will also need to get a monitor and a wired keyboard and mouse. It does not come with a hard drive or wireless networking hardware by default, so you will not need to remove these components before using it. However, we do recommend taping over the IR receiver with some opaque masking tape.
Note that if you do want to use a NUC for the SVS, you should not use any of the new generation of NUCs, which have names starting with “NUC5” (e.g. NUC5i5RYK.. These NUCs have wireless networking built into the motherboard, and it is impossible to physically remove.
The upcoming version of Tails, Tails 3.0, will no longer support 32-bit computers. Please see the note in the Workstations section for more details.
We strongly recommend getting USB 3.0-compatible drives to run Tails from. The transfer speeds are significantly faster than USB 2.0, which means a live operating system booting from one will be much faster and more responsive.
You will need at least an 8GB drive to run Tails with an encrypted persistent partition. We recommend getting something in the 16-64GB range so you can handle large amounts of submissions without hassle. Anything more than that is probably overkill.
Other than that, the choice of USB drive depends on capacity, form factor, cost, and a host of other factors. One option that we like is the Leef Supra.
If you are using USBs for the transfer device, the same general recommendations for the Tails USBs also apply. One thing to consider is that you are going to have a lot of USB drives to keep track of, so you should consider how you will label or identify them and buy drives accordingly. Drives that are physically larger are often easier to label (e.g. with tape or a label from a labelmaker).
If you are using DVD/CD-R’s for the transfer device, you will need two DVD/CD writers: one for burning DVDs from the Journalist Workstation, and one for reading the burned DVDs on the SVS. We recommend using two separate drives instead of sharing the same drive to avoid the potential risk of malware exfiltrating data by compromising the drive’s firmware. We’ve found the DVD/CD writers from Samsung and LG to work reasonably well, you can find some examples here.
Finally, you will need a stack of blank DVD/CD-R’s, which you can buy anywhere.
This is optional, for people who are using a firewall with less than 4 ports (the recommended firewall has 4 ports). Any old switch with more than 3 ports will do, such as the 5-port Netgear ProSafe Ethernet Switch.
Careful consideration should be given to the printer used with the SVS. Most printers today have wireless functionality (WiFi or Bluetooth connectivity) which should be avoided because it could be used to compromise the airgap.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find printers that work with Tails, and it is increasingly difficult to find non-wireless printers at all. To assist you, we have compiled the following partial list of airgap-safe printers that have been tested and are known to work with Tails:
|Model||Testing Date||Tails Versions||Price (new)||Price (used)||Notes|
|HP LaserJet 400 M401n||06/2015||1.4||$178.60 (Amazon)||$115.00 (Amazon)||Monochrome laser printer. Heavy (10 lbs.) When adding the printer in Tails, you need to set “Make and model” to “HP LaserJet 400 CUPS+Gutenprint v5.2.9”.|
|HP Deskjet 6940||04/2015||1.3.2||$639.99 (Amazon)||$196.99 (Amazon)||Monochrome Inkjet printer|
If you know of another model of printer that fits our requirements and works with Tails, please submit a pull request to add it to this list.
Monitor, Keyboard, Mouse¶
We don’t have anything specific to recommend when it comes to displays. You should make sure you know what monitor cable you need for the servers, since you will need to connect them to a monitor to do the initial Ubuntu installation.
You should use a wired (USB) keyboard and mouse, not wireless.